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FOREWORD: ... AND BACKWARD: DEATH

AND TRANSFIGURATION AMONG THE
SAVINGS ASSOCIATIONS
MICHAEL P. MALLOY*
T1HM dramatic collapse of the thrift industry in the United States durking the 1980s has been variously characterized as a "crisis"1I a "debacle" 2 and a "disaster." 3 In fact, it was-and indeed continues to be-a

slow, suffocating death that is still playing itself out, "such a stuffy
death," as Yum Yum would say.4 It is an event that has preoccupied

U.S. regulatory policy towards depository institutions throughout the
past decade.5

* Professor of Law and Director of Graduate Studies, Fordham University School
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Ph.D., Georgetown University (1983). The author thanks Dean John D. Feerick, Professor Michael M. Martin, Faculty Adviser to the Fordham Law Review, and Professor
Carl Felsenfeld, Director of the Fordham Institute on Law and Financial Services, for
their support and encouragement of the Graduate Colloquium. The author acknowledges the invaluable assistance of Mrs. Estelle Fabian, Assistant Director (Administration) of the Graduate Program and the Graduate Program staff, without whom nothing
would ever happen.
1. Felsenfeld, The Savings and Loan Crisis, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Debacle: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L
Rev. S7, S8 (1991).
2. White, The S&L Debacle, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Debacle: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L. Rev. 557, 557 (1991).
3. Case, Deregulation:Invitation to Disasterin the S&L Industry, in Annual Survey
of Financial Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Debacle: Death and Transfiguration,
59 Fordham L. Rev. S93, S93 (1991).
4. W.S. Gilbert & A. Sullivan, The Mikado, Act 2.
5. It may be argued that, in whole or in substantial part, the past four pieces of
omnibus banking legislation enacted by the Congress have been devoted, perhaps futilely,
to the resolution of the crisis in the thrift industry. See Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDAMCA), Pub. L. No. 96-221, 94 Stat. 132
(1980)(codified at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.)(providing, inter alia, for expanded
powers for thrift institutions and higher maximum deposit insurance limits); Gain-St
Germain Depository Institutions Act of 1982 (DIA), Pub. L. No. 97-320, 96 Stat. 14
(1982)(codified at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.)(providing, interalia, for further expansion of powers of thrift institutions); Competitive Equality Banking Act of 1987, Pub. L
No. 100-86, 101 Stat. 552 (1987)(codified at scattered sections of 12 U.S.C.)(providing,
inter alia, for the limiting and conditioning of powers of thrift institutions and holding
companies thereof); Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of
1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183 (1989)(codified at scattered sections
of inter alia, 12 & 15 U.S.C.)(providing for restructuring of federal regulation of thrift
institutions and resolution of failing thrift institutions). On the DIDAMCA, see generally Weaver & O'Malley, The Depository Institutions Deregulationand Monetary Control
Act of 1980:An Overview, 98 Banking L.J. 100 (1981). On the DIA, see generally Zaiteff
& Mette, Investment Powers of Federal Savings and Loan Associations after Garn-St
Germain, 36 U. Fla. L. Rev. 591 (1984); Aronowitz & Volk, Developments in Banking
Law: 1982, 2 Ann. Rev. Banking L. 1 (1983); Norton, The 1982 Banking Act and the
DeregulationScheme, 38 Bus. Law. 1627 (1983). On the FIRREA, see generally Gail &
Norton, A Decade's Journeyfrom "Deregulation" to "Supervisory Regulation' The F.
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The slow death of the thrift industry has prompted a number of responses from policymakers, ranging from shock and accusations to occasionally halting attempts at identifying the root causes of the crisis and
fashioning constructive responses to the crisis. The most palpable result
so far has been the enactment of the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA).6 At this writing, it
remains to be seen whether the FIRREA will bring about a positive
transfiguration of the moribund thrift industry. Still, the task of the
1990-1991 Graduate Colloquium 7 was to examine the circumstances
leading to the collapse of the industry and to speculate about what was
likely to follow in the post-FIRREA era. The views expressed by the
Colloquium participants, and reproduced in the pages that follow, provide useful and often provocative approaches to that task.
Professor Carl Felsenfeld initiated the Colloquium with a thorough
analysis of the historical and regulatory background against which the
crisis unfolded.' The picture that emerges from his analysis is that of an
industry, and a group of regulators, that were to some extent trapped by
their circumstances. Interim responses to an emerging crisis, each arguably reasonable in the context of its specific circumstances, ultimately
proved inadequate as the crisis burgeoned. 9 Professor Felsenfeld gives
explicit attention to what has often been an underlying but unstated
question: does the death of the thrift industry presage a similar fate for
commercial banks? His answer is that it does not,' 0 but this conclusion is
unlikely to appease the doomsayers among us."I
nancialInstitutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989, 45 Bus. Law. 1229
(1990); Gail & Norton, The FinancialInstitutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement
Act of 1989: Dealingwith the Regulators, 107 Banking L.J. 196 (1990); Malloy, Nothing to
Fear but FIRREA Itself- Revising and Reshaping the Enforcement Process of Federal
Bank Regulation, 50 Ohio St. L.J. 1117 (1989).
6. FIRREA, supra note 5.
7. The Graduate Colloquium is a facility established by the Graduate Program of
the Fordham University School of Law for the examination of current legal issues in
areas of particular interest to the Law School's LL.M. programs (i.e., BANKING, CORPORATrE & FINANCE LAW, AND INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS AND TRADE LAW).

The Col-

loquium is a forum for periodic, formal presentations, throughout the academic year, by
leading scholars, government officials, and recognized leaders in practice on cutting-edge
issues in those areas. The theme for the 1990-1991 Colloquium series was The S&L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration.
8. See Felsenfeld, supra note 1.
9. See id. at S8-9.
10. See id. at S40.
11. When compared with the history of the S&L crisis, the current situation of the
commercial banking industry may prompt a sense of deja vu. Consider, for example, the
following observations from the executive summary of a recent Treasury report on the
need for modernization of the U.S. financial system:
[T]he competitiveness of the banking industry has been undercut by our failure
to adapt our banking laws to the evolution of financial markets, which has
brought vigorous new competition to markets traditionally served by banks....
Having lost traditional customers to new competitors, banks have increased
their concentration on remaining customer segments. Weaker banks with virtually unlimited access to federally guaranteed funds have chased too few lending
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The Graduate Colloquium has tried to include an interdisciplinary
dimension to the consideration of the problem of S&L industry. Professor Lawrence White, a noted economist and formerly a member of the
now defunct Federal Home Loan Bank Board, offered a compelling analysis of the problem, focusing upon the distortion of accounting principles
in the practices of the industry. 12 He urged the vindication of what we

may call a truth-in-accounting approach as we emerge from the S&L
debacle. 3
Professor White's view was underscored in the Colloquium presentation by Mr. Richard C. Breeden, Chairman of the Securities and Exchange Commission and a principal architect of the FIRREA. 4 To the
insights of economics, Mr. Breeden's presentation added a legal and pol-

icy dimension, and reached the conclusion that a fundamental realignment of federal policy was required, emphasizing the need for full and
accurate public disclosure, in the regulation of depository institutions. 5

The death of the industry is apparent. What, then, of its resurrection
opportunities, which has created problems for healthier banks: underpriced
loans, narrowed spreads, eroded underwriting standards, and incentives to
reach for riskier loans within the range of traditional bank activities. The result
is diminished profitability, which has undercut the safety and soundness of the
banking system.
[D]eposit insurance coverage has expanded well beyond its original purpose of
protecting small unsophisticated depositors.... This overextension of deposit
insurance has dramatically increased taxpayer exposure.
Overextended deposit insurance has removed market discipline that should have
constrained the increased riskiness of weak banks.... [W]ith expanded federal
insurance and no risk of loss, depositors have been more than willing to supply
funds to weaker banks engaged in activities that produce inadequate returns
and excessive risk. With so little to lose, these weak, undercapitalized banks
have had a perverse incentive to take excessive risk-the "moral hazard" problem-exposing the taxpayer to even greater losses.
[B]ank regulation and supervision helps provide a substitute for the market dis-

cipline removed by deposit insurance. But in the face of the problems discussed
above, our fragmented and archaic regulatory system has not been successful in
stemming the weakening of the banking industry. In recent years, banks have
experienced record loan losses and failures that are rapidly depleting the deposit
insurance fund....
[T]he Bank InsuranceFund•.., is at its lowest level in history as a percentage of
insured deposits. It is projected to decline still further over the next two years.
Without an infusion of funds, the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation...
could face the problems that plagued the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance
Corporation-too little cash, too many incentives for forbearance, and possible
exposure for the taxpayer.
U.S. Department of the Treasury, Modernizing the Financial System: Recommendations
for Safer, More Competitive Banks (1991), reprintedin Fed. Banking L. Rep. (CCH) No.
1377, Part II (Feb. 14, 1991), at 9-10 (emphasis in original).
12. See White, supra note 2.
13. See id. at S69.
14. See Breeden, Thumbs on the Scale: The Role that Accounting PracticesPlayed in

the Savings and Loan Crisis, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation,
The S&L Debacle: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S71 (1991).
15. See id. at S90-91.
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and transfiguration? As I have noted elsewhere, the FIRREA identifies,
even in its name,
the essential elements that stand in balance in the federal response to
the crisis, and these elements are articulated in the explicit statutory
purposes of FIRREA. At the center of this response is an effort to
effect the recovery of the savings association sector [of the depository
institutions industry], by "establish[ing] a new corporation, to be
known as the Resolution Trust Corporation, to contain, manage and
resolve failed savings associations" and by "provid[ing] funds from
public and private sources to deal expeditiously with failed depository
institutions." In addition, the act is intended "telo put the Federal
deposit insurance funds on a sound financial footing."
However, FIRREA is not simply a "bailout" of failing depository institutions. 16 It is evident from the structure of the act that "recovery"
is countered-balanced by a prospective concern with reform of the system of federal regulation of depository institutions, and particularly of
savings institutions, "[t]o promote, through regulatory reform, a safe
and stable system of affordable housing finance." Specific goals of regulatory reform in this regard are articulated by FIRREA....
A final theme in the federal response to the thrift crisis concerns enforcement, a necessary aspect of any program aimed at the prospective
reform of the depository institutions industry and the system of regulation applicable to it. Here the express statutory purposes are "[tie
strengthen the enforcement powers of Federal regulators of depository
institutions" and "[t]o strengthen the civil sanctions and criminal penalties for defrauding or otherwise damaging depository institutions and
their depositors." 1
Has the FIRREA achieved, or is it likely to achieve, a transfiguration
of the depository institutions industry through the application of recovery, reform and enforcement objectives? As is evident from the remaining presentations included in this Colloquium issue, the indications so far
are decidedly mixed.
Professor Fred Case, coauthor of one of the most balanced analyses of
the causes of the S&L crisis,' 8 has raised serious doubts about the efficacy of the process of "recovery" established by the FIRREA."9 He
argues that the resolution procedures and policies adopted pursuant to
FIRREA are impeding private market participation in the S&L recovery.2 ° This is a significant concern, for, as Professor Lissa Lamkin
Broome points out in her presentation, 2 ' private market solutions may
16. White also disputes the popular conception of FIRREA as a "bailout" of failed
savings associations. See White, supra note 2, at S61-62.
17. Malloy, supra note 5, at 1117-18 (footnotes omitted).
18. See N. Strunk & F. Case, Where Deregulation Went Wrong: A Look at the Cause
behind Savings and Loan Failures in the 1980s (1988).
19. Case, supra note 3, at S104-05.
20. See id. at S105-06.
21. See Broome, PrivateMarket Solutions to the Savings and Loan Crisis:Bank Holding Company Acquisitions of Savings Associations, in Annual Survey of Financial Institu-
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provide an important element for achieving an effective transformation of
the industry into a healthy and productive one.' FIRREA has at least
provided the statutory basis for one such solution, the acquisition (and
positive transfiguration) of savings associations by bank holding
companies. 23
The regulatory reform element in the federal response to the S&L crisis was touched upon by virtually all the Colloquium participants, and
particularly by Professor Felsenfeld,24 Professor Vhitel and Mr.
Breeden.26 An extremely important dimension from the perspective of
state law and policy was added by the presentation of Ms. Jill Considine,
then New York State Superintendent of Banks.' Ms. Considine provided a critical reaction to the Treasury report on the need for modernization of the U.S. financial system 28 that had just recently been released
at the time of her presentation in February 1991.29 Contrary to the federalizing trend in depository institutions regulation evident in the report,
she emphasized the importance of the states' role in reform and improvement of the depository institutions industry.3"
As to the enforcement aspect of the FIRREA, it is clear that the act
embodies "a formidable array of expanded regulatory weapons against
impermissible conduct on the part of depository institutions and institution-affiliated parties., 3 1 However, the question remains whether this aspect of the FIRREA program will be effective in contributing to a
positive transformation of the industry.
In his Colloquium presentation, Professor Bruce Green has raised
compelling arguments questioning the sense and sensibility of criminal
penalty provisions of FIRREA and of the overall criminal law response
to the S&L crisis.3 2 In particular, Professor Green casts considerable
doubt on the easy causal connection made, both by lawmakers and regulators, between "fraud" and the emergence of the S&L crisis.3 3
With respect to civil, or regulatory, enforcement responses to the crisis, Professor Lawrence Baxter has convincingly put into question the
tions and Regulation, The S&L Debacle: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L Rev.
S1ll (1991).
22. See id. at S112.
23. See id. at S145-46.
24. See Felsenfeld, supra note 1, at S49-56.
25. See White, supra note 2, at S69-70.
26. See Breeden, supra note 14, at S85-89.
27. See Considine, A State'sResponse to United States TreasuryDepartmentProposals
to Modernize the Nation's Banking System, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions
and Regulation, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S243 (1991).
28. See supra note 11.
29. See Considine, supra note 27, at S252-58.
30. See id. at S255-56.
31. Malloy, supra note 5, at 1152.
32. See Green, After the Fall: The CriminalLaw Enforcement Response to the S&L
Crisis, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, The S&L Debacle:
Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S155 (1991).
33. See id. at S163-68.
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likely effectiveness of the expanded enforcement powers of the depository
institutions regulators. 34 Contrary to the received wisdom on the subject, he argues that courts may be unlikely to accord great deference to
the enforcement activities of the regulators under FIRREA.35
As has so consistently been the case in the history of U.S. bank regulation, 3 6 regulatory reform efforts seem to materialize at the eleventh hour
of crisis, or even later. Such has been the case with the S&L crisis and
the transfiguration of depository institutions regulation that it prompted.
In the current context, the response to the crisis may not have been sufficient or complete, and, as Professors Case, Green and Baxter suggest, the
response may in fact be fundamentally flawed in one way or another.
The progress of the effort for effective regulation of the depository institutions industry thus moves forward and backward according to the vagaries of history. It is hoped that the thoughtful contributions of the
Colloquium participants will serve the positive purpose of focusing attention on important issues of regulatory reform and of moving future reform efforts in a forward direction.
34. See Baxter, JudicialResponses to the Recent Enforcement Activities of the Federal
Banking Regulators, in Annual Survey of Financial Institutions and Regulation, The
S&L Debacle: Death and Transfiguration, 59 Fordham L. Rev. S193 (1991).
35. See id. at S194.
36. See, e.g., 1 M. Malloy, The Corporate Law of Banks 28 & n.1 (1988)(alluding to
the "venerable tradition" in U.S. practice of initiating reform only in response to dire
catastrophe).

